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THE ADOPTION OF TRADENET BY THE TRADING
COMMUNITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Boon Siong Neo
Peng Ean Khoo
Soon Ang
Information Management Research Center
School of Accountancy and Business
Nanyang Technological University
ABSTRACT
TradeNet, an electronic data interchange (EDI) system, has been touted as one of the most successful
implementations of information technology at a nationwide level. To date, assessments of the benefits
arising from TradeNet are anec(total and focus primarily on the benefits accruing to the sponsor, i.e., the
government agency. Notably absent is a systematic assessment of TradeNet from the perspective of the
trading coimnunity.
This paper reports on ali empirical investigation of the adoption of TradeNet by the trading community in
Singapore. Two issues are investigated. First, we examine the factors that determine the timing of
TradeNet adoption by the trading community in a coercive institutional environment. Second, we analyze
post-adoption performances of the trading community. Lessons on the implementation of IT at a
nationwide level ensue.
1. INTRODUCTION assessed by all parties utilizing the system. As pointed out
by O'Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski (1992), the
TradeNet, a nationwide electronic transfer system for trade adoption of an interorganizational electronic linkage is
clearance, has been widely documented as a successful significantly different from the adoption of an innovative
implementation of information technology. Developed with internal technology because interorganizational electronic
Lhe sponsorship of the Trade Development Board (TDB), a systems such as FDI produce changes that affect all parties
government agency established to promote Singapore as an in the exchange relationship. This study analyzes the
international trading hub, TradeNet electronically links the impact of TradeNet from the perspective of the trading
trading community to relevant government authorities. community comprising traders, cargo agents, freight
forwarders, and shipping agents. The benefits inherent of
To date, research on TradeNet has been descriptive in any information system hinge on the trading community's
nature. In a series of Harvard case studies, King and (i.e., end users') ability to utilize the new system. Benefits
Konsynski (1989) and Neo, King and Applegate (1993) derived by the users are necessary not only for justifying
offered rich, historical analyses of how TradeNet utilizes the implementation of such a high capital-intensive IT
different forms of information technology to support and application but also for justifying future IT applications of
redesign the process of trade documentation and trade systemic, nationwide proportions.
clearance. These studies also presented anecdotal accounts
of the benefits as a result of TradeNet. Some of these The primary objective of this paper is to provide an
benefits include tangible cost savings and significant empirical assessment of the adoption and the post-adoption
changes in TDB' s role from that of trade control to trade effects of TradeNet from the perspective of the trading
facilitation. community, By viewing TradeNet as an innovation, we
examine the determinants of the timing of adoption as well
In this study, we contend that, to evaluate any IT which as the factors which affected post-adoption performance of
connects two or more parties, the implementation must be the trading community. In the next section, we described
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the TradeNet system and the unique circumstances that could utilize the prototype on a voluntary basis. The
differentiate TradeNet from other forms of innovation significance of Trade-Dial-Up went beyond a testing ground
adoption. Then, drawing on theories of innovation and for the authorities. It also gave the users or traders a
institutionalization, we develop a research model which chance to test out the innovative concept of on-line trade
delineates the determinants of timing of adoption, as well documentation.
as factors affecting the performance of the trading
community. TradeNet was open to a pilot group on January 1, 1989. In
April of the same year, TradeNet became fully operational.
Although TradeNet was supposed to be mandatory only in
2. THE TRADENET SYSTEM early 1993, the mandatory date was brought forward to
early 1991 because 40% of trade documentation was
TradeNet originated as an initiative from the Singapore submitted via TradeNet eight months after implementation.
government in 1986. Two major driving forces motivated
the implementation of TradeNet: the government's vision As of mid-1991, TradeNet had captured 95% of trade
of Singapore as a leader in the creation and use of documentation volume and had 1,800 subscribers. The
information technologies and the government's desire to remaining 5% of trade documents pertained to disparate
improve Singapore' s competitive advantage in external elements such as personal effects of ship/airline crews and
trading activities after the rude awakening of the 1985 diplomatic staff and commodities such as rice that wererecession.
subject to sensitive regulations.
One area which posed tremendous potential for the use of
IT was the information exchange required in trade Compared to other innovations, TradeNet was unconven-
documentation. In modern trade transactions, large tional because it is a mandatory innovation; the trading
amounts of information must be exchanged between the community had no option about adopting the new trade-
trading community and government agencies to ensure
supporting EDI system. However, individual firms in the
compliance with a myriad o f trade regulations and trading community were given a two-year period to adopt
international trade agreements. This documentation process the system. Thus, TradeNet presents a unique case where
research on innovation diffusion can be examined in thewas tedious and time consuming. Traders had to produce
invoices and other documents to support their applications. midst of coercive institutional pressures.
The process typically involved despatch clerks delivering
required documentation to TDB and returning two days
later to collect the documents. Where the goods required
3. RESEARCH MODEL
payment of customs duties, or where they were governed
by special trade regulations, the same process was repeated One fundamental question underlying this research is, what
with several other government departments before goods were the factors that affected a firm's timing of adoption of
TradeNet, given that the use of TradeNet would eventuallycould be imported or exported,
be mandatory? EDI, of which Tradenet is an archetypal,
As port activities in Singapore increased in number and as represents one of the most significant IT innovations for
international legal agreements increased in complexity,1 the transmitting documents and facilitating the flow of a prod-
traditional trade documentation process became a uct or service. For example, in 1988, 75% of Fortune 100
paperwork bottleneck in trading. Before TradeNet, traders and 39% of Fortune 500 companies were reported to be
had to complete one to three of twenty government using some form of EDI to perform traditional business
documents per incoming or outgoing shipment. TDB was communications (Canright 1988). The Gartner Group
loaded with the paperwork for about 10,000 declarations further estimated in 1989 that one-third of all business
every day. documents would be sent using EDI by 1995 (//S Analyzer
1989). Research to date on EDI has focused primarily on
To streamline trade processing, TDB and the National the strategic implications of interorganizational systems
Computer Board (NCB) jointly developed TradeNet. With (e.g., Venkatraman and Zaheer 1990) and on the sociopoli-
TradeNet, traders submit structured electronic trade permit tical impact of the technology on channel relationships (see
applications to TDB and other government departments. In Stern and Kaufmann 1985). However, with the exception
December, 1986, TDB announced its decision to implement of O'Callaghan, Kaufmann and Konsynski (1992) and
TradeNet and to make the system mandatory by early 1993. Bouchard (1993) which offered sustained inquiries into the
To facilitate the design of the TradeNet system, TDB voluntary adoption of EDI, relatively little is known about
developed an on-line prototype, Trade-Dial-Up. Traders Lhe adoption decision process itselL
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Drawing on Roger's (1983) theory of innovation and the required to adopt TradeNet when the system came into
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) theory of institutional pres- operation. Accordingly, the use of Trade Dial-Up did not
sures, we postulate that the timing of adoption of TradeNet constitute an "early adoption" practice. Because hands-on
is influenced by three broad classes of environmental experimentation reduces uncertainty about the features and
pressures: pressures related to the attributes of the innova- processes inherent in the innovation, we expect trialability
tion (i.e., TradeNet), pressures arising from competitors, to have a positive impact on the timing of adoption.
and pressures from coercive influence.
H2: Firms that had experimented with Trade
Dial-Up would be more likely to adopt TradeNet
3.1 Relative Advantage earlier. Conversely, firms that did not experiment
with Trade Dial-Up would be less likely to adopt
Rogers postulated that attributes of the innovation as TradeNet earlier.
perceived by potential adopters significantly affect innova-
tion adoption. Of the attributes, relative advantage of the
innovation compared to the existing system is regarded as 3-3 Peer Influence
the most significant factor (Tornatsky and Klein 1982;
Rogers 1983). Generally, EDI systems have three immedi- Attributes of innovation such as relative advantage and
ate effects on the quality of interorganizational communica- trialability are critical determinants on the timing of adop-
tions: (1) faster transmission, (2) greater accuracy, and (3) tion. However, focusing solely on such factors overly
more complete information about the transactions (Stern atomizes the decision making process. As argued by
and Kaufmann 1985), In the case of TradeNet, the speed Granovetter (1985) and others (Davis, Bagozzi, and War-
of transmission shortens lead times. Direct computer-to- shaw 1989), organizational decisions are not made in a
computer linkages eliminate despatch clerks, thus reducing vacuum. Rather, they are embedded in a network of social
the labor costs incurred by traders. Furthermore, TradeNet relations. Particularly in the case of TradeNet, external
offers greater accuracy as checking and the approval influences in the form of peer influences from competitors
process are performed automatically. With TradeNet, the can have potentially significant impacts on a firm's decision
same electronic document is used consistently across all on the timing of adoption of TradeNeL In fact, as elabo-
trade controlling agencies instead of separate manual rated by DiMaggio and Powell, in situations of high uncer-
documents. The reduction of the number of manual copies tainty, such as the diffusion of an innovation, "the ubiquity
of documentation means fewer transcription errors and of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely
retyping errors. Thus, we expect be credited to the universality of mimetic processes thali to
any concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance
Hl : The greater the perceived relative advantage efficiency" (pp. 151-152).
of TradeNet over the transactions of business
without TradeNet, the more likely afirm will adopt In this context, target firms may adopt TradeNet because
TradeNet earlier. they observed how peer firms utilize and gain from Trade-
Net. Especially when prevailing managerial practice may
, be perceived to approximate optimal behavior (Anderson
3.2 Trialability 1988), adoption decisions of peer firms foster vicarious
learning on the part of target firms and, hence, encourage
According to Rogers, trialability is defined as the "degree imitative behavior of target firms (Huber 1991), Thus, we
to which an innovation may be experimented on a limited would expect that
basis" (1983, p. 15). An innovation that is trialable is less
uncertain and more valuable to the adopter because it offers H3: Afirm will be more likely to adopt Trad€Net
the adopter the opportunity to learn by using (Rosenburg eartier if its competitors have already adopted
1982). Through experimentation, potential adopters learn to TradeNet. Conversely, a firm will be less likely to
adapt existing business processes to fit the innovation into adopt TradeNet earlier if its competitors have not
the organization' s culture and practices. In the case of adopted TradeNet.
TradeNet, potential users were given the opportunity to
experiment with the TradeNet innovation on a limited basis.
An on-line prototype of TradeNet, known as Trade Dial- 3.4 Coercive Influence
Up, was made available to tmders for experimentation and
trial runs six months before TradeNet became operational. Finally, timing of adoption may be influenced by the
Trial users experimenting with Trade Dial-Up were not coercive institutional influence of government regulators.
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According to DiMaggio (1988), the role of coercive influ- profitability, and revenue growth, and (2) internal planning
ence is particularly powerful in explaining organizational efficiency. Based on concepts of process redesign (Ham-
phenomena in highly regulated industries such as banks or mer and Champy 1993; Davenport 1993) and process
high government regulated societies where well laid-out simplification, we postulate that TradeNet simplifies the
rules, structures, regulation and practices govern the opera- trade clearance process for the trading community, which in
tions of firms. Under these conditions, institutional pres- turn translates to significant overall business performance
sures lead organizations to be guided more by legitimacy and internal planning efficiencies. Three determinants of
concerns than task performance or efficiency consider- post-adoption effects were postulated. First, we hypothe-
ations. A legitimate organization is one that is perceived to sized that positive effects of TradeNet will be felt more
be pursuing socially acceptable goals in a socially accept- strongly by early adopters of TradeNet because they reap
able manner and not necessarily in an economically effi- the benefits of prime mover advantage of the simplification
cient manner. Thus, when legitimacy concerns are high, process. Especially when time represents the most power-
efficiency and performance alone are not sufficient in ful new source of competitive advantage (Stalk and Hout
explaining organizational actions (Epstein and Votaw 1978). 1990), early adopters can capitalize on the prime mover
advantage of reorganizing their organizations to cut lead
Given that TradeNet is a government initiative and a times and offer customers quicker delivery. Thus,
mandatory EDI system, we would expect that firms, guided
by legitimacy considerations, would adopt TradeNet earlier HS: The earlier the adoption of TradeNet, the
if the perceived coercive influence from the government better the post-adoption performance of the firm.
regulators with regards to the use of TradeNet is high.
Thus, Second, we hypothesized that the benefits of TradeNet will
be felt most strongly in firms who were able to take advan-
H4: The greater the perceived influence of the tage of TradeNet in redesigning and streamlining their
government regulators, the more likely a finn witt internal trade documentation workflow and processes. This
adopt TradeNet earlier. is in line with the concept of business process reengineering
(Davenport 1993; Hammer and Champy 1993) and the
evidence from Morris and Holman (1988). IT and, in
4. POST-ADOPTION EFFECTS OF TRADENET particular, EDI simplified existing internal processes which
can lead to significant firm efficiencies and productivity.
Research on the impacts of EDI systems is relatively Thus,
sparse. In a literature review, O'Callaghan, Kaufmann, and
Konsynski found that the focus on EDI effects has been the H6: The more TradeNet is integrated to the
sociological impacts of the technology rather than direct firm's internal processes and procedures, the
productivity, efficiency, or performance effects of techno- better the post-adoption performance of the firm.
logy. EDI was found to formalize the communication
processes and procedures that enhance speed, accuracy, and Third, as a control variable, we hypothesized that the
completeness of interorganizational communications (Stern degree of business computerization will not, in itself, affect
and Kaufmann 1985). firm performance. On the surface, this seems to rui
contrary to the implicit belief that IT has an impact on the
In one of the few studies that focused on competitive or organizational performance (Crowston and Treacy 1986, p.
performance effects, Morris and Holman (1988) observed 226; Raymond, Pare, and Bergeron 1993). However, as
that simplification of the buyer's tasks as a result of EDI demonstrated by Weill and Olson (1989), Raymond, Pare
significantly affected buyer's loyalty to a supplier. In and Bergeron (1993), and Chan and Huff (1993), IT has
another study, Monczka and Carter (1989) showed that EDI impacts on firm performance only when contingency factors
enabled suppliers to gain considerable competitive advan- such as strategic fit, IS-business alignment, structure, and
tage by being more responsive to buyers' needs. Finally, uncertainty are factored into the IT-firm performance
Venkatraman and Zaheer (1990) found that EDI-linked relationship. Similarly, in this case, we suspect that busi-
insurance agents increased the number of policies written ness computerization or the level of IT usage will not, in
with the focal carrier at a significantly greater rate than the itself, significantly improve firm perfonnance. As argued
nonlinked agents, thus supporting the case that firms that by Hammer (1990), merely automating fundamentally
adopt EDI linkages with their suppliers increased the archaic or flawed processes will not yield substantial gains.
percentage of business they do with that supplier. Thus, controlling for all other factors,
In this study, we examined the impact of TradeNet on two H7: The extent of business computerization has
performance measures: (1) overall business performance of no significant eJIect on the post-adoption perfor-
the firm as measured by business market share, overall mance of the firin
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5. RESEARCH METHOD 5.2.2 Independent Variables
5.1 Sampling Relative advanmge, the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes, was
The sample for this study was drawn from a population of operationalized as the extent to which TradeNet reduces
TradeNet users in Singapore provided by the Singapore paperwork costs and supports business objectives of the
Network Services (SNS), a private company that was firm. Trialability, the degree to which an innovation may
established to design and implement TradeNet. As of be experimented, was operationalized as the extent to which
October, 1992, there were 1,535 active TradeNet users a firm had used Trade Dial-up, the prototype to TradeNel.
grouped by number of permit declarations submitted via Peer influence refers to the influence from mimetic isomor-
TradeNet. A stralified random sample of 504 was selected phic pressures to adopt TradeNet. It was operationalized as
to allow representations across all groups. Heavier users of the extent to which a firm adopted TradeNet because
TradeNet were consciously over sampled because impacts, competitors were using it. Coercive influence refers to the
if any, are likely to be more discernible among these users. influence from coercive isomorphic pressures to adopt
TradeNet. It was operationalized as the extent to which a
A questionnaire was sent to the General Manager or Man- firm adopted TradeNet because it perceived strong govern-
aging Director of each user firm. There were 504 question-
ment pressures to use it.
naires sent but four were undelivered and returned, thereby
reducing the sampling base to 500 questionnaires. Of these Degree of process inregration refers to the extent of inte-
500 questionnaires, 158 completed and usable question- gration between TradeNet and the user firm' s internal
naires were returned, yielding a response rate of 31.6%. systems in three areas: data, approval, and application.
Fourteen responses were removed from the 158 question- First, the required data for TradeNet permits may beentered manually or retrieved automatically from other
naires because they represented firms that began operations systems. Second, approvals from TDB to traders may be
in Singapore after January 1989, the date TradeNet was
monitored manually by the trader or monitored automatical-first implemented. This was done to remove distortion to ly by the trader's internal computer systems which wouldthe data, which otherwise would have skewed the data then trigger necessary actions and transactions upon approv-
toward later adoption. Thus, subsequent analysis was al. Finally, traders may operate TradeNet as a standalone
performed on a sample of 144 firms. system or as an integrated system with other application
systems in the firms. Degree of business computerization
To determine the representativeness of the sample, respon- refers to the extent to which an organization has automated
dent profiles were compared with the profiles of all Trade- its functional activities. It is operationalized as a composite
Net users on record. A chi square test revealed that a index formed from individual indicators which assess the
disproportionate number of firms with a higher number of extent to which computers are used to support order pro-
declarations (at least 75 per month) responded (%2 - 15.66, cessing, marketing and sales, operations, warehousing and
p < .05). This is consistent with our original sampling inventory, accounting, administration, and personnel.
strategy where we oversampled large users because returns Measures for each of the constructs are provided in the
on IT investment are likely to be more discernible among appendix.
heavier users of the technology (Stevens 1990).
5-3 Construct Validation
5.2 Measures
A combination of single and multiple item measures were
5.2.1 Dependent Variables used in this study. Discriminant and convergent validity
among the measures were examined by using Campbell and
Timing ofadoption was operatio, alized as the lag, in terms Fiske's (1959) MTMM matrix. From Table 1, we observe
of number of months, between the first Tradenet adopter that within-measure item correlations are consistently
and the date the respondents first used TradeNet. Post- greater than between-measure correlations, indicating
adoption pelybrmance was operationalized as the impact of acceptable discriminatory validity.
TradeNet on (1) overall business performance measured by
perceived market share, revenue growth and profitability For multiple item constructs, items in each construct were
and (2) planning efficiency measured by the impact of subjected to factor analysis to ensure a single factor struc-
TradeNet on staff, logistics, and inventory scheduling. ture for that construct. All items for each construct have
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Table 1. Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix of Measures
Measures RAl RA2 RA3 RA4 RAS TRIAL PEER COERCIVE ADOPTN INTEG 1 INTEG2 INTEG3
RAl 1.0000
RA2 0. 1.0000
RA3 0.5872 0. 1.0000
RA4 0.2858 0.6136 0.3 .0000
RA5 0.4475 0.3861 0.2855 0.44 1.0000
TRIAL 0.1212 0.0585 0.1978 0.0251 0.0672 1.0000
PEER 0.2222 0.2679 0.2358 0.1696 0.2729 0.0674 1.0000
COERCIVE 0.0251 0.0830 -0.0132 -0.0257 -0.0331 -0.1643 -0.0825 1.0000
ADOPTN 0.0240 -0.0045 -0.0979 0.1243 -0.0739 -0.2956 -0.1801 0.0157 1.0000
INTEGl -0.0269 -0.0271 0.1636 0.1064 0.1008 0.2724 0.1216 -0.0715 -0.0011 1.0000
INTEG2 0.0578 0.0413 0.1304 0.2082 0.2638 0.2622 0.2129 -0.1781 -0.0291 1833#x-1.0000
INTEG3 0.0844 0.0506 0.1539 0.1631 0.2461 0.2125 0.1080 -0.1029 -0.0496 10.3438 ir.*364 1.0000
COMP1 0.1268 0.1200 0.1483 0.0816 0.1841 0.1825 -0.0572 -0.1518 -0.3093 0.1663 0.1116 0.1968
COMP 2 0.2689 0.0873 0.2492 0.0725 0.2775 0.1958 -0.0657 0.0392 -0.3101 0.0844 0.1861 0.2405
COMP3 0.2636 0.1937 0.2452 0.1925 0.2737 0.1391 0.1846 -0.0674 -0.1890 0.1420 0.1785 0.1832
COMP4 0.1931 0.2024 0.1236 0.0797 0.1645 0.1193 0.0653 -0.0394 -0.2349 -0.1357 0.0558 0.1535
COMPS 0.2125 0.1582 0.1202 0.0235 0.2318 0.0105 0.0186 0.0989 -0.2146 -0.0174 -0.0219 0,0141
COMP 6 0.1999 0.0607 0.1621 0.0077 0.1583 0.2718 -0.0157 -0.1728 -0.3935 0.0591 0.0853 0.1095
COMP 7 0.1192 0.1064 0.0867 0.0301 0.1701 0.1130 -0.0943 0.0363 -0.2109 0.0432 0.0529 0.1369
BUSl -2.3380 -0.3145 -0.1399 -0.4162 -0.4676 -0.1597 -0.3041 -0.0189 0.1409 -0.1452 -0.2398 -0.0823
BUS2 -0.2395 -0.3449 -0.1652 -0.3974 -0.3505 -0.0950 -0.2433 -0.0313 0.2045 -0.0601 -0.2096 -0.0947
BUS3 -0.2517 -0.3269 -0.2032 -0.3504 -0.3702 -0.1274 -0.3721 -0.0729 0.1926 -0.1249 -0.1921 -0.1061
PLANt -0.2027 -0.2614 -0.2002 -0.2915 -0.2923 -0.1040 -0.1759 0.0413 0.0382 -0.1050 -0.2451 -0.1333
PLAN2 -0.2475 -0.3425 -0.3074 -0.3321 -0.3386 -0.0248 -0.1905 0.0302 0.0378 -0.0744 -0.2506 -0.2976
PLAN3 -0.1924 -0.2438 -0.2394 -0.3220 -0.3764 -0.0371 -0.2877 0.0690 0.1116 -0.1487 -0.3124 -0.3518
Note: Definition of measures is provided in the appendix.
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Table L Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix of Measures (Continued)
Measures COMPl COMP 2 COMP 3 COMP4 COMPS COMP6 COMP 7 BUSl BU52 BUS3 PLAN 1 PLAN2 PLAN3
RAl
RA2
RA3
RA4
RAS
TRIAL
PEER
COERCIVE
ADOPTN
INTEGl
INTEG2
INTEG3
COMPl 1.0000
COMP 2 . 1.0000
COMP3 0.5087 0. 1.0000
COMP4 0.5645 0.6152 0. 66-_1.0000
COMPS 0.5759 0.5576 0.5372 0. 1.0000
COMP6 0.5332 0.5216 0.6184 0.3562 0.3 .0000
COMP7 0.4448 0.4960 0.3448 0.4679 0.3259 0.66 1.0000
BUSl -0.0926 -0.2049 -0.2639 -0.2076 -0.1792 -0.1017 -0.0855 1.0000
BUS2 -0.1246 -0.2506 -0.2701 -0.2460 -0.2233 -0.1989 -0.1441 0. 1.0000
BUS3 -0.1182 -0.2952 -0.2912 -0.1878 -0.2295 -0.1429 -0.0696 0.7088 0. 1.0000
PLANt -0.0237 -0.1111 -0.1055 -0.0991 -0.1726 -0.1195 -0.0543 0.4305 0.4129 O.Solo 1.0000
PLAN2 0.0343 -0.1570 -0.2058 -0.1593 -0.1923 -0.1452 -0.1322 0.4548 0.5208 0.5093 10.38 1.0000
PLAN3 -0.0129 -0.1896 -0.2346 -0.1081 -0.1314 -0.1117 -0.0655 0.4900 0.5075 0.5831 |0.5604 -0. 1.0000
Note: Definition of measures is provided in the appendix.
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Coefficient of Variation
and Intercorrelations Among Constructs -
Constructs Mean Standard Coefficient of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Deviation Variation
1. Relative 25.26 6.19 4.08 1.00
Advantage
2 Trialability 2.84 2.08 137 0.14 1.00
3. Peer 3.37 1.98 1.70 0.32 0.07 1.00
Pressure
4. Coercive 6.00 1.57 3.82 0.02 -0.16 -0.08 1.00
Influence
5. Timing of 18.53 10.90 1.70 -0.04 -030 -0.18 0.02 1.00
Adoption
6. Degree of 8.93 4.93 1.81 0.18 0.33 0.17 -0.15 -0.03 1.00
Process
Integration
7. Degree of 33.4 9.63 3.47 0.19 0.29 -0.02 -0.16 -0.42 0.22 1.00
Business
Computerization
8. Business 9.92 3.04 3.26 -0.44 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 0.19 -0.17 -0.28 1.00
Performance
9. Planning 9.84 2.99 3.29 -0.43 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 008 -0.28 -0.26 0.57 1.00
Efficiency
Note: Defintion of constructs is provided in the appendix.
substantial loadings onto single factor structures and items 6.2 Post-Adoption Effects
were summed into a composite measure for each construct.
Next, each construct with its corresponding items was The regression model to test for post-adoption effects is
subjected to Cronbach's alpha reliability testing to assess its formulated as
internal consistency. Based on the item-to-total correlation
statistic, items were culled to produce the most reliable Yj= aj + b5Xs + b6) 6 + 4) 7 + bsXS
multiple-item measures (Nunnally 1978). The final reliabil-
ity coefficients for multi-item constructs range between .75 where Yj = Business Performance; Planning Efficiency
and .90 (see the appendix). The means, standard devia-
lions, coefficients of variation, intercorrelations among the X5 = Timing of Adoption
constructs are given in Table 2.
X6 = Degree of Process Integration
X7 = Degree of Business Coinputerization5.4 Statistical Analysis
Two multiple regression models were formulated to test the The second set of multiple regression analyses examines the
above hypotheses. First, a model was formulated to exam- relationships among the hypothesized determinants of the
ine the four hypothesized determinants of the timing of performance of firms that adopted TradeNet. Given that
adoption (1 I 1 to H4). Then, a second regression model was there are two separate dependent measures of post-adoption
for,nulated to examine the determinants of post-adoption
effects - business performance and planning efficiency -
perfonnance (H5 to H7). The results of each of these two an overall multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
was conducted, and was found to be significant (Hotelling'smodels are discussed separately iii the following section.
T2 = .708; p < 01). Subsequent follow-up univariate
analysis of variance were conducted to assess the signifi-
cance of each hypothesized determinant on each of the two6. RESULTS
post-adoption effects.
6.1 Timing of Adoption
6.3 Business Performance
The mgression model to test for the timing of adoption is
formulated as Table 4 shows the results of the follow-up univariate
analysis on business performance. The results indicate that
Yl =: at -*- bl) l ·+ 1 2X2  | 3Xj  b*XA the degree of process integration was a sigidficant determi-
nant of business performance (ttNTEG = 1.99; p < .05).
where Y, = timing of adoption However, the hypothesized relationship between timing of
adoption and business performance was not (4 opT = -1.54;
X, = relative advantage p > .10). Furthermore, as hypothesized, no significant
relationship was found between degree of business comput-
X2 = trialability erization and business performance (rCOMP = 1.04; p> 30).
X3 = peer influence
6.4 Planning Efficiency
X4 = coercive influence
Table 5 shows the iresults of the follow-up univariate
Table 3 shows the results of the multiple regression analy- analysis on planning efficiency. The results indicate that
sis. The results indicate that trialability was an important the degree of process integration was a significant determi-
element in the decision to adopt TradeNet earlier than later nant of planning efficiency (tiNTEG = 3.87; p < .00). Also,
(tTRIAL = - 2.8; p < .01), and the hypothesized relationship the hypothesized relationship between timing of adoption
between peer influence and timing of adoption was signifi- and planning efficiency was significant at the p < .10 level
cant at p < .10 level (|PEER = 1.8; p =.06). No statistically (cCOMP = 1.88; p =.06). As with business performance, no
significant relationship was found between expected relative statistically significant relationship was found between
advantage (tu - •301; p > .D or coercive influence on the timing of adoption and planning efficiency (tADOFT = -0.99;
timing of adoption (|Coar[VE = ·29; p > .7). P > 30).
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Table 3. Results of Regression Model of Timing of TradeNet Adoption
Dependent Variable: Timing of Adoption
Independent Variables Hypothesis Estimate Standard Error T - Statistic Prob.
Relative Advantage 1 .048 .16 .301 .764
Trialability 2 -1.352 .482 -2.805 .006
Peer Influence 3 ..982 .527 1.864 .065
Coercive Influence 4 .192 .641 .299 .765
R Square .102
Adjusted R .069
Table 4. Results of Regression Model of Post-Adoption Performance
Dependent Variable: Business Performance
Independent Variables Hypothesis Estimate Standard Error T - Statistic Prob.
Timing of Adoption 5 -.060 .038 -1.54 .13
Degree of Process Integration 6 .149 .075 1.99 .05
Degree of Business Compu- 7 -.046 .044 1.04 .30
terization
R Square .21
Adjusted R .16
Table 5. Results or Regression Model of Post - Adoption Performance
Dependent Variable: Planning Efficiency
Independent Variables Hypothesis Estimate Standard Error T - Statistic Prob.
Timing of Adoption 5 0.036 0.04 0.99 0.32
Degree of Process Integration 6 0.268 0.07 3.87 0.00
Degree of Business Computer- 7 0.076 0.04 1.88 0.06
ization
R Square .29
Adjusted R .24
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7. DISCUSSION and late adopters averted any potential erosion of late-
adopters' customer base who may be tempted to switch to
7.1 Timing of Adoption other competitors who were earlier adopters of TradeNet.
The study found that trialability and peer influence were The degree of process integration was significantly asso-
important factors affecting the timing of adoption of Trade- ciated with both business performance and planning effi-
Net, thus supporting hypotheses 2 and 3. Voluntary users ciency. Therefore, hypothesis 6 was supported. It appears
of Trade Dial-Up were the earliest and most enthusiastic that firms which had re-engineered their trade documenta-
adopters of TradeNet, implying that experimentation rein- lion processes in tandem with TradeNet adoption experi-
forced the benefits of the innovation. These users in turn enced the most benefits. The integration of TradeNet ilito
became industry pace-setlers for other traders who became iii ternal organizational processes provided traders with
aware of the benefits of TradeNet vicariously through these significant time compression in their trade cycle. In con-
early adopters. SubsequenUy, firms competing directly with trast, firms that adopted TradeNet only as a standalone
these early adopters were influenced to follow quickly in system found that the trade processing cycle remained
adopting TradeNel lengthy. In some cases, the processing cycle with a stand-
alone TradeNet became even more arduous because of
Effects of relative advantage and coercive influence were newly discovered bottlenecks in their internal paperwork
not significant, and thus hypotheses 1 and 4 were not flows.
supported. The lack of variatice in the measurement of the
two variables accounted for the insignificant findings. In Finally, the degree of business computerization was margin-
terms of relative advantage, the coefficient of variation was ally associated with planning efficiency but not with busi-
4.08, suggesting that the benefits of using TradeNet were so ness performance. Hypothesis 7 is therefore partially
obvious that it was not difficult for traders to have consen- supported. The lack of impact of the degree of business
sus on its utility regardless of their timing of adoption. The computerization on business performance was expected. It
savings in turnaround time and labor utilization were supports the current view that investments in IT without a
uniformly enjoyed by all adopters and visible to the entire corresponding fundamental change to business processes
trading community. offer no substantive benefits at the business level. On the
other hand, the significant relationship between computer-
The same argument holds for the perceived degree of ization and planning efficiency suggests that planning
government pressure to use TradeNet. The coefficient of efficiency may be a more direct measure than business
variation was 3.82. All traders were continuously asked to performance for the impact of computerization. Thus,
use TradeNet and the fees for manual processing were planning efficiency is an intermediate measure that may be
raised lo give the message greater persuasive power. enhanced because of computerization.
Furthermore, eight months after TradeNet's launch in
August, 1989, TDB announced that TradeNet would be
made mandatory in 1991 instead of the previous deadline of 8. CONCLUSION
1993. In addition, 'IDB counters for manual trade permit
applications would be closed by 1991. Thus, there were no Lessons abou t implementing a nationwide IT system may
doubts in the traders' mind that TDB was exercising be drawn from the above results. To ensure and facilitate
increasing pressures for TradeNet's adoption. rapid adoption, users must be given the opportunity to
experiment and learn by using. Also, adoption behaviors of
peers and competitors provide added impetus for the rapid
7.2 Post-Adoption Effects diffusion of adoption. Because of the lack of variance in
the coercive influence variable, we did not find a statistical
The timing of adoption did not have a significant relation- relationship between coercive influence and timing of
ship to both post-adoption effects measured. Hypothesis 5 adoption. Nevertheless, we believe that a high coercive
was therefore not supported. The lack of support may be influence is in fact vital for ensuring adoption of a nation-
due to the rapid adoption of TradeNet by the trading wide innovation. This point is reinforced by Hong Kong's
community. TradeNet was handling 60% of all trade experience with their version of TradeLink where the
documentation by the end of the first year and 90% by the perceived lack of government support was the Achilles'
end of the second year. The rapid diffusion of TradeNet heel of the project (Asian Finance 1987).
meant that differential performance due to the presence or
absence of TradeNet was experienced only very tempora- In terms of the effectiveness of IT systems, the study
rily. Il also appears that the short time lag between early underscores the need for individual firms to reengineer
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existing organizational processes to order to reap significant Organizations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger,
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APPENDIX
Measures of Hypothesized Determinants of the Timing of TradeNet Adoption
Constructs Measure Reliability
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of "1" to "7" (where "1" represents "Strongly Disagree,. "4,
represents "Neutral" and "7" represents "Strongly Agree"), the extent to which they agree or disagree with the
following reasons as the basis for their respective organization's decision to use TradeNet
Relative Advantage Cronbach
a =.7903
(RAl) "Reasons for Using TradeNet - We wanted to reduce our costs of trade
processing"
(RA2) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - We wanted to improve our service to our
customers"
(RA3) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - We wanted to reduce paperwork in our
organization"
(RA4) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - TradeNet was crucial for us to achieve our
strategic business objectives"
(RA5) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - We wanted to move into Electronic Data
Interchange technology for other uses"
Peer Influence N.A.
(PEER) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - Our competitors were using TradeNet and
we could not afford not to use it"
Coercive Influence N.A.
(COERCIVE) "Reasons for TradeNet Use - The government requires all trade declara-
tions to be sent through TradeNet"
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of "1" to "7" (where "1" represents "Strongly Agree," "4" represents
"Neutral" and "7" represents "Strongly Disagree"),the extent to which the following statement represents how
TradeNet is actually used by their respective organizations:
Trialability N.A.
(TRIAL) "TradeNet Use Characteristics - We used Trade Dial-Up before TradeNet"
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Measures of Hypothesized Determinants or Performance
Constructs Measure Reliability
Timing of Computed from respondents' replies to "When did your organization first N.A.
Adoption used TradeNet? (Month/Year)"
Degree of Respondenrs were asked to indicate on a scale of "1" to "7" (where "1" Cronbach
Process represents "Strongly Disagree,  444" represents "Neutral" and "7" represents a = .7571
Integration "Strongly Agree"), the extent to which the following statements represent
how TradeNet is actually used by their respective organizations:
(INTEGl) "Characteristics of Tradenet Use - Data required for TradeNet are retrieved
automatically from other systems"
(INTE(32) "Characteristics of Tradenet Use - Approval of trade declarations automati-
cally triggers other transactions in our computer system"
(INTEG3) "Characteristics of Tradenet Use - TradeNet is integrated with our other
computer/communications systems"
Degree of Respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of computerization on a Cronbach a
Business scale of "0," "10," "30," "50," "70," "90,. , 100," NA (if no corresponding =.8887
Computerization listed function) for each of the various functional areas in their respective
organizations:
(COMPl) "Functional Areas - Order Processing"
(COMP2) "Functional Areas - Marketing/Sales"
(COMP3) "Functional Areas - Operations"
(COMP4) "Functional Areas - Warehousing/Inventory"
(COMP5) "Functional Areas - Accounting"
(COMP6) "Functional Areas - Administration"
(COMP7) "Functional Areas - Personnel"
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**Performance" Measures
Constructs Measure Reliability
Respondents were asked to indicate on a scale of "1" to "7" (where "1" represents "Much Worse Off," "4" represents
"No Change" and "7" represents "Much Better Off'), the extent to which TradeNet has affected their respective
operations in the following areas:
Business Cronbach
Performance a =.9033
(BUSl) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Market share"
(BUS2) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Revenue growth"
(BUS3) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Overall profitability"
Planning Efficiency Cronbach
a =.8600
(PLAN1) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Customer service"
(PLAND "Characteristics of Business Operations - Ability to plan/schedule staff'
(PLAN3) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Ability to plan/schedule
delivery vehicles"
(PLAN4) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Ability to plan/schedule use of
warehouse space"
(PLAN5) "Characteristics of Business Operations - Ability to commit on turn-
around time"
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